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POTENTIAL LITIGATION AGAINST
AUDITORS FOR NEGLIGENCE
Thomas C. Pearson
This Article addresses potential litigation against auditors for
negligence, an especially important topic because such litigation is likely to
increase in future years. Several reasons exist for more litigation on
negligence. First, in the 2010 Supreme Court case reviewing the status of
the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), both sides
accepted the PCAOB as a government regulatory agency, at least for some
purposes. This implies that the auditing standards as approved by the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) should have some legal status.
Second, three major reforms of relevant professional standards are
occurring. Because the new standards leave more room for judgment, they
are likely to increase litigation against auditors. Third, the auditing
industry’s fundamental duties of care to avoid negligence are extensive and
illustrated primarily by inspection reports and enforcement cases presented
by the PCAOB. Fourth, recent attempts to limit auditors’ liability have
failed. Thus, real steps by the auditing profession are needed primarily to
raise the quality within the profession to help limit potential future litigation
against auditors.
INTRODUCTION
Auditing plays an essential role for society’s capital markets.1 The
auditing profession is expected “to bring integrity, independence,
objectivity, and professional competence to the financial reporting
process.”2 The auditor is not an insurer of the financial statements, but does
provide reasonable assurances to management’s representations in financial
statements.3 Auditing of public companies4 has become increasingly


Professor of Accounting, University of Hawaii (UH) Shidler College of Business and
member of UH’s William Richardson School of Law’s Institute of Asian Pacific Business Law;
recipient of the 2005 George A. Katz Memorial Award for excellence in Securities Law at New
York University; J.D./M.B.A. from Vanderbilt 1984. The author extends his thanks to the Center
for International Business Education and Research, and members of his Fall 2010 Accounting 625
class: Accounting and Tax Research.
1. The U.S. Supreme Court has even summarized the important role of auditing. See United
States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 810−11, 817−18 (1984).
2. U.S. GOV’T. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-163, AUDITS OF PUBLIC COMPANIES:
CONTINUED CONCENTRATION IN AUDIT MARKET FOR LARGE PUBLIC COMPANIES DOES NOT
CALL FOR IMMEDIATE ACTION 7 (2008), available at www.gao.gov/new.items/d08163.pdf.
3. It is important to remember that “[a]uditors do not make the business decisions or create
the external events that cause a company’s failure.” Rod Phelan & Gavin R. Villareal, Issues in
Accountant Liability Litigation Arising from Business Failures (Tex. Trial Lawyers Ass’n
Commercial
Litig.
Seminar,
Discussion
Draft,
2006),
available
at
http://www.bakerbotts.com/infocenter/publications/?page=81 (follow “Issues in Accountant
Liability Litigation Arising from Business Failures” hyperlink).
4. An audit of a public company is “an examination of the financial statements of any issuer
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intertwined with the law5 in the decade following the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002 (SOX).6 Dramatic developments in the profession,7 Congress,
regulatory agencies, and the courts, have affected the environment for
auditing and litigation against auditors.
SOX was landmark legislation which expanded upon the duty for
internal controls for public companies.8 SOX also added penalties for
financial crimes,9 including interference with an audit or government
investigation.10 It substantially improved corporate governance and the
“tone at the top” of public companies.11 SOX has also produced some
improvements in internal controls, financial reporting and disclosure, and
the performance of auditors, and has enhanced government enforcement.12
The PCAOB, created by SOX.13 replaced self-regulation of the audit
profession,14 and led to stronger oversight of financial reporting.15 The
United States government encouraged other countries to establish similar
quasi-governmental oversight over auditors, independent from the

by an independent public accounting firm in accordance with the [PCAOB] rules . . . for the
purpose of expressing an opinion on such statements.” See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 2(a)(2),
15 U.S.C. § 7201(2) (2006).
5. In leading capital market countries, more auditing authorities have become law in order to
increase accountability of public companies, their auditors, and the standard setters in auditing and
accounting. See generally Thomas C. Pearson, Creating Accountability: Increased Legal Status of
Accounting and Auditing Authorities in the Global Capital Markets (U.S. and EU), 31 N.C. J.
INT’L L. & COM. REG. 65 (2005).
6. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, and 29 U.S.C.).
7. Audit methods have evolved during the past couple decades, such as increased “risk based
auditing.”
8. 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (2006).
9. Penalties for financial crimes added by SOX include financial fraud, white collar crime,
and improper certification of financial statements by the Chief Executive Officer and Chief
Financial Officer. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1501 (2006).
10. 15 U.S.C. § 7242(a) (2006); 18 U.S.C. § 1512 (2006).
11. For example, an enhanced audit committee role has occurred as a result of SOX. 15 U.S.C.
§ 78j-1 (2006).
12. Cf. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-419SP, GAO FORUM ON GOVERNANCE
AND ACCOUNTABILITY: CHALLENGES TO RESTORE PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN U.S. CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE
AND
ACCOUNTABILITY
SYSTEMS
(2003),
available
at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03419sp.pdf (identifying “challenges facing regulators, the
accounting profession, and boards of directors and management of public companies in effectively
implementing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and related regulatory actions to improve public
confidence in U.S. corporate governance and accountability systems”).
13. 15 U.S.C. § 7211 (2006).
14. See Daniel L. Goelzer, Auditing Under Sarbanes-Oxley: An Interim Report, 7. J. BUS. &
SEC. L. 1, 4, 5 (2007). See generally James D. Cox, Reforming the Culture of Financial
Reporting: The PCAOB and the Metrics for Accounting Measurements, 81 WASH. U. L. Q. 301,
304 (2003).
15. See Goelzer, supra note 14, at 1, 2, 4 (discussing how the unreliability of financial
information was painfully evident after uncovering massive amounts of fraudulent financial
statements of major companies in the early 2000s).
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profession. Such changes in overseeing the auditing profession have made it
possible for more global interaction of regulatory authorities.16
Inspections of financial audits are among the powers delegated to the
PCAOB.17 The quality of such inspection reports has been the PCAOB’s
real success to date.18 These reports have revealed that many deficient
audits exist, with a substantial number of audits having failed at least once
to apply a basic generally accepted accounting principle (GAAP) or by
implication, generally accepted auditing standard (GAAS).19 The preface of
each PCAOB inspection report shows that the PCAOB believes its reports
are merely produced for remedial educational purposes, not for any legal
uses.20
In 2010, in Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB,21 the Supreme Court
accepted the PCAOB’s legal status as a governmental agency.22 Although
16. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, 2008 SECURITIES LITIGATION STUDY 53 (2009),
http://10b5.pwc.com/PDF/NY-09-0894%20SECURITIES%20LIT%20STUDY%20FINAL.PDF
[hereinafter PWC 2008 STUDY] (“[R]egulators around the [world have] becom[e] more active and
[are] increasing cooperation [with the SEC].”). In 2008, the SEC assisted with over 590 requests
from foreign regulators as a result of “several bilateral and multilateral arrangements that the SEC
has entered into in recent years.” U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 2008 PERFORMANCE AND
ACCOUNTABILITY
REPORT
5
(2008),
www.sec.gov/about/
secpar/secpar2008.pdf.
17. 15 U.S.C. § 7214 (2006). Other PCAOB powers include regulating the industry through
registration of audit firms of public companies, standard setting, and enforcement actions against
registered accounting firms performing audits of public companies. See id. §§ 7212, 7215, 7218.
18. See generally Thomas C. Pearson & Gideon Mark, Investigations, Inspections, and Audits
in the Post-SOX Environment, 86 NEB. L. REV. 43, 84–85 (2007) (discussing the effects of the
PCAOB inspections and reports). Compared to prior peer reviews conducted within the industry,
“PCAOB’s inspections are more rigorous, more technical, and more intense.” See id. at 81.
19. See PUB. CO. ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BD., REL. NO. 2007-010, REPORT ON THE
PCAOB’S 2004, 2005 AND 2006 INSPECTIONS OF DOMESTIC TRIENNIALLY INSPECTED FIRMS
(2007), http://pcaobus.org/Inspections/Documents/2007_10-22_4010_Report.pdf [hereinafter
REPORT ON PCAOB].
20. See, e.g., PUB. CO. ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BD., REL. NO. 104-2005-082, INSPECTION
OF BECKSTEAD & WATTS, LLP (2005), http://pcaobus.org/Inspections/Reports/Documents/
2005_Beckstead_and_Watts.pdf [hereinafter INSPECTION OF BECKSTEAD & WATTS].
“[R]eferences [to violation of laws, rules, or professional standards] are not a result of an
adversarial adjudicative process and do not constitute conclusive findings of fact or of violations
for purposes of imposing legal liability.” Id.
21. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010). A
constitutional challenge to the PCAOB’s legal status was started after a small boutique audit firm
received a critical inspection report from the PCAOB. Id. at 3149. A non-profit public interest
organization, Free Enterprise Fund, joined the audit firm as plaintiffs in the litigation. Id. The
Court of Appeals in a 2-1 decision held that there was no constitutional problem. Id. The Supreme
Court held in a 5-4 decision that the only unconstitutional aspect was the double removal clause,
an easily fixable problem. Id. at 3146, 3151, 3161, 3164. For the accounting perspective on the
case, see Ronald R. King, The PCAOB Meets the Constitution: The Supreme Court to Decide on
the PCAOB’s Conformity with the Separation of Powers Doctrine and Appointments Clause, 24
ACCT. HORIZONS 79 (2010). For details of the investigation that launched the case, see
INSPECTION OF BECKSTEAD & WATTS, supra note 20, at 3 (finding that in half of the audits
inspected, the audit firm did not obtain “sufficient competent” evidence to support its audit
opinion).
22. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3163–64.
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the case’s real significance is its effect on administrative law,23 indirectly,
the case reveals how the auditing profession’s audits of public companies
are legally regulated. The majority opinion of the Court of Appeals for the
D.C. Circuit was based on the reasoning that the PCAOB is subject to
pervasive SEC control.24 The SEC’s control over the PCAOB includes the
SEC’s power to approve the PCAOB’s budget.25 Also, while the PCAOB
can propose rules, the SEC decides whether to adopt them.26
Part I of this Article discusses major developments in professional
standard reforms that impact litigation against auditors for negligence.
These new standards include the adjustment to new U.S. GAAP, the
movement toward international accounting standards, and a likely subset of
accounting standards for private companies. These accounting changes also
enable more second guessing by litigators as to whether an accountant and
an auditor have properly applied the appropriate accounting standards.
Part II analyzes potential negligence by auditors. Specifically, duties of
care that auditors owe are revealed through breaking down the professional
standards into fundamental material duties. Breaches of these duties are
often illustrated in the PCAOB’s releases for inspection reports of firms and
enforcement actions.
Part III examines the audit industry’s failed recent pursuit of legal
liability limitations. The failure of the auditing industry to gather any
significant support for liability limitations is an additional development
suggesting how the public views litigation as one means to accountability.
Part IV proposes reforms both in the law and the auditing profession in
response to the real need of the auditing profession to raise the audit quality
to prevent potential litigation. The public expects high audit quality and the
23. See Richard H. Pildes, Free Enterprise Fund, Boundary-Enforcing Decisions, and the
Unitary Executive Branch Theory of Government Administration, 6 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB.
POL’Y 1 (2010). See generally Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, Why Professors Bruff
and Pildes Are Wrong About the PCAOB Case, 62 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 133 (2009); Michael
A. Carvin, Noel J. Francisco, & Christian G. Vergonis, Massive, Unchecked Power by Design:
The Unconstitutional Exercise of Executive Authority by the Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board, 4 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 199 (2007); Michael R. Keefe, The Constitutionality of
the Double For-Cause Removal Restriction: Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board, 537 F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir. 2008), 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 1653 (2009); Gary Lawson,
The “Principal” Reason Why the PCAOB Is Unconstitutional, 62 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 73
(2009); Donna M. Nagy, Is the PCAOB a “Heavily Controlled Component” of the SEC?: An
Essential Question in the Constitutional Controversy, 71 U. PITT. L. REV. 361 (2010); Donna M.
Nagy, Playing Peekaboo with Constitutional Law: The PCAOB and Its Public/Private Status, 80
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 975 (2005); Richard H. Pildes, Putting Power Back Into Separation of
Powers Analysis: Why the SEC-PCAOB Structure is Constitutional, 62 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC
85 (2009).
24. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3149. The SEC plays an essential role in the auditing
environment, due to its role in letting the private sector set accounting standards for public
companies. Also, the SEC can establish accounting practices for public companies, such as
Application of Regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R. § 210 (2010).
25. 15 U.S.C. § 7219 (2006).
26. Id. § 7217(b)(2).
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profession needs to take more self-help steps to minimize likely litigation
against the industry in the future. Conclusions are presented at the end.
I. REFORMS OF PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS ASSIST
LITIGATORS’ ATTACKS
Standards in accounting and auditing exist to encourage corporate
management and their accountants to exercise due professional care in the
performance of their duties.27 Due care imposes a professional
responsibility on the auditors to follow generally accepted auditing
standards and apply generally accepted accounting principles in auditing the
financial statements of a client entity.28
A serious problem for the auditing profession was that the increased
complexity of accounting standards had overwhelmed the capacity of most
accounting and auditing professionals.29 Furthermore, a confusing set of
multiple sources existed for GAAP. In 2009, the Financial Accounting
Standards Board (FASB) sought to help by creating the Accounting
Standards Codification (ASC), a single source for U.S. GAAP.30
In the process of creating the ASC, U.S. GAAP is now shorter, more
principled, and easier to research than old U.S. GAAP. Litigation over
application of professional standards should once again generate a demand
for more detailed accounting and auditing rules. Since finding appropriate
authority is much easier work than previously, these changes make it more
likely that litigators can and will conduct accounting and auditing research.
They can find the appropriate accounting authority that should have applied
to the financial statements under scrutiny in the litigated case. One area of
the ASC of particular concern is the likely increase in disclosure for certain
loss contingencies.31 The fear is that increased disclosure will likely lead to

27. See CODIFICATION OF ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES, Statement on
Auditing Standards No. 113, §§ 150.02, 230.01 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 2006).
28. Enforcement of professional standards relies primarily on the responsible individual or
organization, secondarily upon the accounting professionals, thirdly on auditors, fourthly on
investigation by the overseeing government agency, and lastly by litigation in the courts.
29. See FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., NOTICE TO CONSTITUENTS (V 4.1) ABOUT THE
CODIFICATION 5 (2010).
30. Id. The SEC is authorized to determine the accounting principles for the financial reporting
by public companies, such as application of Regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R. § 210.1-01 (2010).
However, the SEC usually defers to the FASB to create accounting standards. See Commission
Statement of Policy Reaffirming the Status of the FASB as a Designated Private-Sector Standard
Setter, 68 Fed. Reg. 23,333, 23,335 (May 1, 2003).
31. “In July 2010, the FASB issued an Exposure Draft, Contingencies ([ASC] 450): Disclosure
of Certain Loss Contingencies.” Randall D. McClanahan, Law and Accounting Committee
Summary of Current FASB Developments, JOHNSTON BARTON ATTORNEYS (2010 ABA Annual
Meeting, San Francisco, CA), Aug. 7, 2010, at 1; FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., FINAL
ACCOUNTING SERIES, CONTINGENCIES (TOPIC 450): DISCLOSURE OF CERTAIN LOSS
CONTINGENCIES (2010). The proposed changes increase the required disclosures. See
McClanahan, supra. For a discussion of loss contingencies, see Kenneth E. Harrison & Thomas C.
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more litigation.32
International financial reporting standards (IFRS) are the product of the
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB).33 In 2007, the IASB was
recognized by the SEC as an official standard setter in accounting.34 The
initial roadmap for convergence of accounting standards has evolved into a
comprehensive IFRS “work plan” to permit U.S. public companies to use
IFRS.35 It is possible that U.S. public companies will start using IFRS in
2015.36 Initially, the change from U.S. GAAP to IFRS creates an increased
chance of litigation because of the “greater risk of misunderstanding and of
improper application of” the standards, given unfamiliar rules.37 Adoption
of the IFRS will also create an expanded litigation risk for auditors and
accountants because of fewer rules and more decisions based on the
auditor’s judgment.38 Professional judgment requires reasoning based on a
Pearson, Communications Between Auditors and Attorneys for the Identification and Evaluation
of Litigation, Claims, and Assessments, 3 ACCT. HORIZONS 76 (1989).
32. See Letter from Thomas W. White (Chairman of the ABA’s Law and Accounting
Committee), et al., to International Accounting Standards Board, on Measurement of Liabilities in
IAS 37: Proposed Amendment to IAS 37 (May 19, 2010), http://www.abanet.org/
buslaw/blt/content/2010/11/0005.pdf.
In-house attorneys particularly may face pressures to disclose sensitive legal advice. In
their financial statements, reporting entities will need to disclose, with respect to
recognized liabilities that are subject to estimation uncertainty, the expected timing of
payments and an indication of the uncertainties about the amount or timing of such
payments.
Id. at 3.
33. About
the
IFRS
Foundation
and
the
IASB,
IFRS
FOUND.,
http://www.ifrs.org/The+organisation/IASCF+and+IASB.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2011).
International accounting standards are included within the IFRS. Id.
34. Thus, foreign companies may now file their financial statements with the SEC using
IASB’s IFRS without reconciling to U.S. GAAP. See Acceptance from Foreign Private Issuers of
Financial Statements Prepared in Accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards
Without Reconciliation to U.S. GAAP, 73 Fed. Reg. 986 (Jan. 4, 2008) (to be codified at 16
C.F.R. pts. 210, 230, 239, 249).
35. See Matthew E. Kaplan & Steven J. Slutzky, Goodbye Roadmap, Hello Work Plan: SEC
Continues to Consider Use of IFRS by U.S. Issuers, ACCT. POL’Y & PRAC. REP. (BNA), May 14,
2010, available at 2010 WL 1917096.
36. OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ACCOUNTANT, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, WORK PLAN FOR THE
CONSIDERATION IF INCORPORATING FINANCIAL REPORTING STANDARDS INTO THE FINANCIAL
REPORTING SYSTEM FOR U.S. ISSUERS 2 (2010), http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/global
accountingstandards/globalaccountingstandards.pdf. See also Commission Statement in Support
of Convergence and Global Accounting Standards, 75 Fed. Reg. 9,494, 9,495 (Mar. 2, 2010).
37. Jay Epstein & Susan Cheng, Broader Acceptance of IFRS in U.S. Capital Markets:
Implication for Attorneys, 14(1) SEC. LAW (Int’l Bar Ass’n Legal Practice Div., London, U.K.),
Apr. 2008, at 21, 22, available at http://www.int-bar.org/images/downloads/Newsletters/Securities
LawApril2008.pdf. See generally William W. Bratton & Lawrence A. Cunningham, Treatment
Differences and Political Realities in the GAAP-IFRS Debate, 95 VA. L. REV. 989 (2009);
Roberta S. Karmel, The EU Challenge to the SEC, 31 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1692 (2008); Neal F.
Newman, The U.S. Moves to International Accounting Standards—A Matter of Cultural
Discord—How Do We Reconcile?, 39 U. MEM. L. REV. 835 (2009).
38. See Bratton & Cunningham, supra note 37; Karmel, supra note 37; Newman, supra note
37. See also Epstein & Cheng, supra note 37.
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documented analysis of the issues.39 Furthermore, since “IFRS includes a
much greater degree of qualitative analysis than U.S. GAAP,”40 expanded
litigation risk exists under IFRS.
Private sector accounting is also likely to change. In 2009, for midsized and smaller companies the IASB has created even fewer accounting
rules to simplify the accounting knowledge needed to prepare the financial
statements.41 The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
(AICPA), together with the oversight body for FASB, created a Blue
Ribbon Panel to study this development for application to the U.S. private
sector.42 More second guessing by lawyers and judges is likely to occur
when fewer rule-oriented accounting standards exist.
II. PROFESSIONAL DUTIES AFFECTING LITIGATION FOR
NEGLIGENCE
Negligence against an auditor is based on state law.43 Negligence
generally requires the plaintiff prove a duty owed to the plaintiff, a breach
of that duty, causation (both factual and proximate), and damages.44 To
whom a duty is owed (whether a duty is owed to third parties) has received
extensive attention.45

39. If detailed analysis exists, some believe that “[n]egligence is even more difficult to prove
when the accountant’s subjective judgment is in issue.” Accounting, Practice & Responsibility
Portfolio 5500: Preparing for and Defending Accounting Liability Litigation, TAX MGMT.
PORTFOLIOS (BNA), 2006, § V.B.2, available at 2006 WL 2624270 [hereinafter Accounting,
Practice & Responsibility Portfolio].
40. See Vincent J. Love & John H. Eickemeyer, IFRS and Accountants’ Liability, CPA J., Apr.
2009, at 54.
41. INT’L ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., A GUIDE TO THE IFRS FOR SMES (2010),
http://www.ifrs.org/NR/rdonlyres/4308000F-FAC8-41F3-BC15-E594E8058EB6/0/GuideToIFRS
forSMEs2010Oct.pdf. See also IFRS for SMEs Fact Sheet, INT’L ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD.
(July 9, 2009), http://www.ifrs.org/NR/rdonlyres/FBAE7BA8-8B32-43F8-AE3C-D4DA92D046
C6/0/IFRSforSMEsfactsheet2.pdf.
42. Panel to Address Accounting Standards for Private Companies, J. OF ACCT., Dec. 17,
2009, http://www.journalofaccountancy.com/Web/20092429.htm. The eighteen member Blue
Ribbon Panel has a mixture of financial statement “users, creditors, lenders, owners of businesses,
and preparers.” Denise Lugo, Private Company Reporting: Blue Ribbon Panel to Weigh
Launching Standard Setter for U.S. Private Companies, ACCT. POL’Y & PRAC. REP. (BNA), Apr.
16, 2010, available at 2010 WL 1510529.
43. Minor variations exist among states in the explanation “of the elements of professional
negligence.” See Accounting, Practice & Responsibility Portfolio, supra note 39, at V.B. n. 89.
44. DAN L. GOLDWASSER & THOMAS ARNOLD, ACCOUNTANTS’ LIABILITY §§ 4-1–4-2 (PLI
Corp. & Sec. L. Libr. 1996); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328A (1965).
45. See generally John W. Bagby & John C. Ruhnka, The Controversy Over Third Party
Rights: Toward More Predictable Parameters of Auditor Liability, 22 GA. L. REV. 149 (1987);
Willis W. Hagen II, Accountants’ Common Law Negligence Liability to Third Parties, 1988
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 181; Carl Pacini, Mary Jill Martin & Lynda Hamilton, At the Interface of
Law and Accounting: An Examination of a Trend Toward a Reduction in the Scope of Auditor
Liability to Third Parties in the Common Law Countries, 37 AM. BUS. L.J. 171 (2000); Jodi B.
Scherl, Note, Evolution of Auditor Liability to Noncontractual Third Parties: Balancing the
Equities and Weighing the Consequences, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 255 (1994).
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At issue is the nature of the duty when the accountant does not fully
comply with applicable professional standards. The nature of the legal duty
of care owed has rarely received much analysis. An auditor has the duty to
use the skill and knowledge possessed by an accountant in good standing.46
“Expert testimony is usually necessary to establish the standard of care
required of an accountant since the matter is ‘beyond the realm of ordinary
lay knowledge.’”47 Proof of the duty normally occurs through work-papers,
audit manuals, records, and expert testimony.48 The plaintiff’s expert
generally identifies the duty of care and points out any material departure
from that duty.
“Professional standards are commonly looked to as evidence of the
appropriate standard of care in a negligence case . . . .”49 The failure of
applying any fundamental auditing duty in a material way should lead a
jury to conclude that it was a material departure and negligent breached of
duty.50 The question for the jury for negligence too often is when this part
of the auditor’s material conduct falls outside professional standards. The
jury needs further guidance as proposed in the forthcoming tables.
Ten fundamental audit standards provide a framework for the
responsibilities of auditors based on generally accepted auditing standards.51

46. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A (1965) (requiring that “one who
undertakes to render service in the practice of a profession or trade is required to exercise the skill
and knowledge normally possessed by members of that profession or trade in good standing in
similar communities”).
47. GOLDWASSER & ARNOLD, supra note 44, § 4-2, at 4-36 (quoting Kemmerlin v. Wingate,
261 S.E.2d 50, 51 (S.C. 1979)).
48. See Leo R. Beus, Workpapers, Audit Materials, Personnel Records and Expense Account
Information Can Often Provide Helpful Information in an Audit Malpractice Case, SN073 A.L.I.A.B.A. CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. 139 (2008).
49. GOLDWASSER & ARNOLD, supra note 44, § 4-2, at 4-39.
50. Some courts require articulation of relevant duties of care under GAAS and how they were
breached at the pleading stages. See, e.g., In re Westinghouse Sec. Litig., 90 F.3d 696, 712 (3d
Cir. 1996).
51. CODIFICATION OF ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES, Statement on Auditing
Standards No. 113 § 150.02 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 2006). These ten standards
are:
General Standards
1. The auditor must have adequate technical training and proficiency to
perform the audit.
2. The auditor must maintain independence in mental attitude in all matters
relating to the audit.
3. The auditor must exercise due professional care in the performance of the
audit and the preparation of the report.
Standards of Field Work
1. The auditor must adequately plan the work and must properly supervise
any assistants.
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The Statements of Auditing Standards (SASs) expand upon the GAAS
framework.52 The PCAOB adopted the 2003 version of the Codification of
the Statements on Auditing Standards (AU) as interim audit standards.53
The duties from all these standards are not yet, arguably, law in the audit of
public companies because the standards are not effective until approved by
both the PCAOB and SEC.
The PCAOB’s inspection reports separate negligent audit failures from
any legal implications. “[The PCAOB inspection report] reviews . . .
certain aspects of selected audits performed by the firm and reviews . . .
other matters related to the firm’s quality control system.”54 Deficiencies in
auditing or accounting are raised in the PCAOB’s inspection reports.55
Insights into the variable quality of the audits of public companies are
provided in these inspection reports.56
Enforcement actions by the PCAOB occur if either: (A) “intentional or
knowing conduct . . . violat[es] . . . applicable statutory, regulatory, or
professional standard[s];” or (B) there are “repeated instances of negligent
conduct.”57 Thus, the PCAOB has lower standards of enforcement than
should exist in negligence lawsuits in the courts.
Tables 1 to 3 provide examples of auditors’ duties and cases where an
entity has breached the auditing standard duty of care.58 Simplified
2. The auditor must obtain a sufficient understanding of the entity and its
environment, including its internal control . . . .
3. The auditor must obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence by
performing audit procedures to afford a reasonable basis for an opinion
regarding the financial statements under audit.
Standards of Reporting
1. The auditor must state in the auditor’s report whether the financial
statements are presented in accordance with [GAAP].
2. The auditor must identify in the auditor’s report those circumstances in
which [GAAP] principles have not been consistently observed . . . .
3. When the auditor determines that informative disclosures are not
reasonably adequate, the auditor must so state in the auditor’s report.
4. The auditor must either express an opinion regarding the financial
statements . . . or state that an opinion cannot be expressed, in the auditor’s
report.
Id.

52. SASs were created and codified by the AICPA.
53. PCAOB
History,
PUB.
CO.
ACCOUNTING

OVERSIGHT
BD.,
http://pcaobus.org/About/History/Pages/History.aspx (last visited Feb. 9, 2011).
54. INSPECTION OF BECKSTEAD & WATTS, supra note 20, at 2.
55. Id. at 2–3.
56. Id.
57. 15 U.S.C. § 7215(c)(5) (2006).
58. While some of the sources provided in the tables give the precise section in the AU, other
sources lack the reference but are discernable by their description of the audit problem.
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standards in the tables are presented for purposes of explaining them to a
jury of non-accountants. Other standards exist, but they have rarely led
regulators to cite them for violation. These examples are presented
primarily through PCAOB inspection reports and enforcement actions. U.S.
standards are shaped by U.S. legal jurisprudence and SEC requirements.59
International standards on auditing (ISA) generally evidence the same
fundamental duty.60
Table 1: Selected Field Work Duties Under
Generally Accepted Auditing Standards
AU §

ISA
comparable

312

320

313

500

316

240

316

240

316

240

317

250

319

324

402

Example of Auditors’ Duties
Under GAAS Which if Breached
Creates Negligence
Duty to determine the appropriate
audit risk and materiality levels of
important items that may impact the
financial statements
Duty to use substantive tests on the
financial statement assertions, prior
to the balance sheet date
Duty to evaluate the risk of fraud
in the financial statements
Duty to evaluate transactions
which appear fraudulent
Duty to consider whether a change
in auditing procedures is needed to
obtain more reliable evidence
because of a higher risk of fraud
Duty to design the audit to provide
reasonable assurance of detecting
material misstatement arising from
illegal acts that could have a direct
and material impact on the financial
statements
Duty to consider internal control
for purposes of the financial
statements
Duty to consider the effect of

Example(s) of a Breach
of Duty
AAER 2779, 13

PCAOB Rel. No. 1042010-025, 4
AAER 3099, 3
PCAOB Rel. No. 1042007-087, 5
PCAOB Rel. No. 1042005-120, 9
PCAOB Rel. No. 1052007-002, 7
PCAOB Rel. No. 1052007-009, 12

PCAOB Rel. No. 1042008-249, 4
PCAOB Rel. No. 1042006-203, 6
PCAOB Rel. No. 104-

Comparable international standards on auditing (ISA) provisions are provided because more than
100 countries are either using ISAs or have declared their intent to use them. International
Standards on Auditing, ESTANDARDSFORUM, http://estandardsforum.org/about_standards/
international-standards-on-auditing (last visited Jan. 27, 2011).
59. Because of the different legal environment in the United States, U.S. “standards are often
more directive and procedures oriented” than ISA. James M. Sylph, Technical Director, Int’l
Auditing & Assurance Standards Bd., Speech at American Accounting Association Auditing
Section 2005 Mid Year Conference: Global Convergence—Near or Far? (Jan. 14, 2005)
(transcript available at http://press.ifac.org/speech/2005/01/global-convergence-near-or-far).
60. See INT’L FED’N OF ACCOUNTANTS, HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL QUALITY CONTROL,
AUDITING, REVIEW, OTHER ASSURANCE, AND RELATED SERVICES PRONOUNCEMENTS (2010),
http://web.ifac.org/publication.
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service organizations, such as
payroll handlers, on the entity’s
internal control
Duty to review samples of the
underlying accounting data and
corroborating information
Duty to test management’s fair
value measurements and disclosures

326

530

328

545

150
329

500

330

Cf. 580

330

505

331

501

333

580

334

550

336

620

Duty to evaluate any relationships
and findings from a specialist, such
as a valuation expert

337

501

341

570

342

540

342

540

350

530

Duty to obtain appropriate and
timely responses from the entity’s
attorneys considering litigation,
claims, and assessments
Duty to determine if substantial
doubt exists about an entity’s ability
to continue as a going concern for
the next year
Duty to evaluate the reasonableness
of significant accounting estimates
made by management, including the
methodology and assumptions used
Duty to consider the historical
experience of the entity in making
past estimates to assess the
reliability of the process in making
current estimates
Duty to make a sample size
sufficiently large to obtain
reasonable assurance to detect

Duty to obtain sufficient
competent evidential matter
obtained through inspection,
observation, inquiries, and
confirmation so as to create a
reasonable basis for an audit
opinion
Duty to obtain and evaluate
confirmations and other evidence
collected from third parties about
management’s financial statement
assertions
Duty to maintain control over the
confirmation requests and
responses
Duty to test appropriately for the
existence, completeness, and
valuation of inventory
Duty to investigate if audit evidence
contradicts a representation made
by management
Duty to seek to identify related
party relationships and transactions

2006-003, 3

PCAOB Rel. No. 1042009-069, 6
PCAOB Rel. No. 1042008-231, 4
PCAOB Rel. No. 1042009-069, 6
PCAOB Rel. No. 1042005-138, 7

AAER 3146, 4
PCAOB Rel. No. 1042005-138, 7
PCAOB Rel. No. 1042006-002, 12
PCAOB Rel. No. 1042009-157, 4
PCAOB Rel. No. 1052010-003, 11
AAER 3116A, 6
PCAOB Rel. No. 1042008-219, 4
PCAOB Rel. No. 1042010-077, 4
PCAOB Rel. No. 1042006-079, 4
PCAOB Rel. No. 1042009-157, 4
PCAOB Rel. No. 1042009-149, 4
PCAOB Rel. No. 1042010-081, 4
PCAOB Rel. No. 1042006-203, 10
PCAOB Rel. No. 1052007-006, 8

PCAOB Rel. No. 1042006-202, 9
PCAOB Rel. No. 104-
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350

530

380

260

390

misstatements
Duty for a sample to represent the
population from which the sample
was selected and project
misstatements from the sample to
the population
Duty to inform the board of
directors’ audit committee about
any material disagreements with
management
Duty to assess important audit
deficiencies identified after the date
of the audit report

[Vol. 5
2006-205, 4
SEC Administrative
Proceeding
No. 3-12208

PCAOB Rel. No. 1052006-001, 3

Table 2: Selected Other Duties Under
Generally Accepted Auditing Standards
AU §

ISA
comparable

150

200

210

220

220

200

230

200

230

220

410

230

431

200

435

501

508

700

543

600

550

560

Example of Auditors’ Duties
Under GAAS Which if Breached
Creates Negligence
Duty to have sufficient knowledge
of the relevant audit standards
Duty to have adequate technical
training and proficiency as an
auditor
Duty to ensure that the auditors are
free of personal impairments to
independence
Duty to exercise due professional
care and professional skepticism
in the performance of the audit
Duty to supervise properly those
involved in the audit, based on their
level of knowledge, skill, and ability
to evaluate the audit evidence
Duty to report whether the financial
statements are in
accordance with GAAP
Duty to adequately disclose the
information in the financial
statements
Duty to determine if additional
accounting segment information is
needed
Duty not to express an unqualified
audit opinion if the auditor has not
performed the audit in accordance
with PCAOB standards
Duty to assume responsibility for
the work of another auditor or
reference the audit of the other
auditor and indicate the division of
responsibility
Duty to determine whether the
financial statements, the audit

Example(s) of a Breach
of Duty
AAER 3027, 5
PCAOB Rel. No. 1042010-102, 3
AAER 3122, 2
AAER 3146, 4
PCAOB Rel. No. 1042006-181A, 6
PCAOB Rel. No. 1052007-005, 5
PCAOB Rel. No. 1042009-069, 4
PCAOB Rel. No. 1052009-001, 8
PCAOB Rel. No. 1042005-119, 4
PCAOB Rel. No. 1042005-119, 4
PCAOB Rel. No. 1052009-001, 4
PCAOB Rel. No. 1042005-138, 6

PCAOB Rel. No. 1052009-005, 7
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560

560

561

560

report, or both require revision
when a material inconsistency exists
with the financial statements
Duty to evaluate events after the
balance sheet date, but prior to the
issuance of the financial statements,
which provide additional evidence
about conditions that existed at the
balance sheet date
Duty to consider the impact of
subsequent events after the balance
sheet date but before the date of the
auditor’s report on the financial
statements
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PCAOB Rel. No. 1052007-006, 10

PCAOB Rel. No. 1052009-001, 9

Table 3: Selected Duties Under
PCAOB’s New Audit Standards
Rule or
standard
Rule
4006
Rule
5102
AS No.
1
AS No.
3

AS No.
3
AS No.
5

Example of Auditors’ Duties
Which if Breached Creates
Negligence
Duty not to provide misleading
documents
Duty to cooperate with a
PCAOB(or applicable regulatory
agency) investigation
Duty to conduct the audit of a public
company in accordance with
PCAOB standards
Duty to prepare audit
documentation in sufficient detail to
provide a clear understanding of its
purpose, source, and the conclusions
reached
Duty to indicate the date information
was added, the author of such
documentation, and the reason for
adding it
Duty to test management’s assertion
of internal control

Examples of a Breach of Duty
PCAOB Rel. No. 105-2009-002, 4
PCAOB Rel. No. 105-2010-005, 2
PCAOB Rel. No. 105-2010-004, 2
PCAOB Rel. No. 105-2010-006, 5
PCAOB Rel. No. 2005-138

PCAOB Rel. No. 105-2009-002, 5

PCAOB Rel. No. 105-2009-006

GAAP became more principled in the 2009 creation of the ASC. As a
consequence, accounting duties of care became easier to detect.
Theoretically, accounting standards are part of auditing law because any
departure from GAAP is a violation of GAAS.61 GAAS are the auditing
standards used by the PCAOB and formally recognized by the SEC.62 Two
sets of accounting standards are recognized by the SEC and AICPA. These
standards are U.S. GAAP by the FASB and IFRS63 by the IASB.64
61. CODIFICATION OF ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES, Statement on Auditing
Standards No. 113 § 150 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 2006).
62. Pearson, supra note 5, at 109.
63. IFRS includes International Accounting Standards (IAS).
64. See supra note 33.
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Table 4 extracts various duties of care from GAAP, recognizing that
professional judgment under GAAP sometimes accepts a range of
accounting treatments. These basic rules became more obvious with the
revision of GAAP in 2009 into the FASB’s Accounting Standards
Codification. Auditors help to ensure that client management follows the
applicable accounting standards.
Table 4: Selected Duties Under
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
FASB ASC
250-10-501
225-10S99-1(c)
Glossary
(capitalize)
820-10-30

IASB
IFRS
IAS 8

IAS 8
IAS 8

350-20-351
350-30-3514

IAS 38

360-10-35

IFRS 5

605-15-253
310-10-30
810-10-1

IFRS 3

740-10-30

IAS 12

ASC > 900

IAS 41

230-10-459
942-810S99-1

IAS 7

Example of Auditors’ Duties to
Recognize What GAAP Requires
Duty to disclose nature of an
accounting change and the reason
for it
Duty to evaluate an accounting
conversion to/from U.S. GAAP
Duty not to capitalize an expense
Duty to evaluate whether the value
of material property is properly
assigned
Duty to test annually for impairment
of an intangible asset which is not
subject to amortization, such as
goodwill
Duty to test long-lived assets for
recoverability when events indicate
possible non-recoverability
Duty to establish a reserve for
estimated future returns
if revenue is recognized at the time
of shipment
Duty to test whether option rights
would result in probable economic
benefits for asset reporting
Duty to consolidate all majorityowned subsidiaries
Duty to determine deferred taxes
separately for each tax-paying
consolidated entity in each tax
jurisdiction
Duty to apply industry specific
guidance
Duty not to report non-cash activities
in a statement of cash flows
Duty to assess whether the risks and
rewards of ownership were
transferred in a nonperforming
asset

Examples of a Breach
of Duty
PCAOB Rel. No. 1052008-004, 8
PCAOB Rel. No. 1052009-001, 7
PCAOB Rel. No. 1052008-004, 13
PCAOB Rel. No.
2007-010
PCAOB Rel. No. 1042010-081, 5

PCAOB Rel. No. 1052007-001, 9-10
PCAOB Rel. No. 1052005-003, 4
PCAOB Rel. No. 1052008-001, 8

PCAOB Rel. No.
2007-010
PCAOB Rel. No. 1052007-002, 6
PCAOB Rel. No. 1052007-001, 5

2011]

Potential Litigation Against Auditors for Negligence

419

“Improper professional conduct” by accountants and auditors is
classified by the SEC into two groups.65 The first class is “[a] single
instance of highly unreasonable conduct.”66 The second class is “[r]epeated
instances of unreasonable conduct.”67 These classes help the SEC analyze
the appropriate sanction to impose. Litigators might use these classes to
distinguish degrees of negligence.
III. AUDIT INDUSTRY’S FAILED PURSUIT OF LEGAL
LIABILITY LIMITATIONS
High insurance costs,68 settlement costs,69 and litigation costs plague the
auditing industry.70 Among securities class action lawsuit settlements,
accounting-related settlements are significantly higher than non-accounting
settlements.71 The number of securities class action lawsuits involving
accounting has dropped to the lowest level post-SOX with them accounting
for only 40% of the securities class action cases in 2008.72 Yet, the auditing
profession has remained very concerned that even a few lawsuits could
cripple a major accounting firm.73

65.
66.
67.
68.

SEC Rules of Practice, 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e)(1) (2010).
Id.
Id.
Lack of access to adequate insurance coverage helped motivate the auditing profession to
seek liability reform. Insurance coverage had decreased while premiums paid for coverage had
increased, in part because the high loss ratio of claims incurred exceeding premiums received. For
example, insurance premiums rose five-fold from 1984 to 1987 while the number of insurers
dropped “from twelve in 1980 to three in 1986.” Gary Lawson & Walter Olson, Civil Justice
Memo No. 16, Caveat Auditor: The Rise of Accountants’ Liability, MANHATTAN INST. FOR POL’Y
RES. (May 1989), http://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/cjm_16.htm.
69. High settlement costs are shown in a table with the top fifty all time accounting
malpractice settlements 1991–2008, based on audit analytics. See Mark L. Cheffers, Accounting
Malpractice Scorecards, SN073 A.L.I.-A.B.A CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. 369 (May 15, 2008).
Some say “insurmountable pressure” exists for settlement, especially after class action
certification. See John Gibeaut, An Outside Shot at Securities Fraud, A.B.A. J., June 2007, at 20.
70. See Thomas Lys & Ross L. Watts, Lawsuits Against Auditors, 32 J. ACCT. RES. 65 (1994).
Selected portions of the audit industry are more likely to incur litigation. Lawsuits against auditors
are more likely “when client firms are larger, experience financial difficulties and poor stock
performance, and receive qualified audit reports. A lawsuit is also more likely if the auditor
employs an unstructured audit technology and if the client represents a relatively larger proportion
of the auditor’s revenues.” Id. at 65.
71. PWC 2008 STUDY, supra note 16, at 23. The accounting firm average settlement in 2008
was approximately $51.7 million. Id. at 24. However, “[t]he highest nine [securities class action]
settlements [in 2008] were exclusively accounting-related settlements.” Id. at 5.
72. Id. at 9.
73. See Steven Taub, Support for Limiting Auditor Liability, CFO.COM (Jan. 18, 2005),
http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/3574746/c_3574770?f=home_todayinfinance.
Commercial
insurance could cover less than 5% of large claims against some audit firms. See LONDON ECON.
& RALF EWERT, STUDY ON THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF AUDITORS’ LIABILITY REGIMES: FINAL
REPORT TO EC-DG INTERNAL MARKET AND SERVICES (MARKT/2005/24/F) xxxiii (2006),
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/auditing/docs/liability/auditors-final-report_en.pdf.
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In 2005, caps on legal liability74 were sought by audit firms in the
European Union (EU).75 Although some limited support existed for the
proposal, the audit industry failed to obtain any protection against
potentially large damages. Instead, liability protection varies among the EU
member countries.76 With the expansion of securities lawsuits within the
EU during the last five years,77 the problem of the lack of legal liability
protection becomes more acute for the auditing profession. In 2008, a report
from the European Commission provides some support for auditor liability
caps, but again no action has been taken.78
In the United States, audit firms have attempted to address the liability
problem in various ways.79 In 2005, the Big Four audit firms included
“punitive damage waivers in their client contracts.”80 The PCAOB found

74. James H. Irving, Jeff L. Payne, & Paul L. Walker, An Empirical Examination of the Impact
of Liability Caps on the Auditing Market 14 (Working Paper Series, Feb. 15. 2010) (citing PUB.
CO. ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BD., EMERGING ISSUE—THE EFFECTS ON INDEPENDENCE OF
INDEMNIFICATION, LIMITATION OF LIABILITY, AND OTHER LITIGATION-RELATED CLAUSES IN
AUDIT ENGAGEMENT LETTERS (2006), http://pcaobus.org/News/Events/Documents/02092006_
SAGMeeting/Indemnification.pdf), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=1490056.
Liability provisions are found in engagement letters between clients and audit firms. . . .
The PCAOB uses a . . . classification system of eight groups: indemnification, liability
limited to fees, limitations based on time period of claim, limitations related to client’s
right to assign or transfer the claim, exclusion of punitive damages, agreements on
alternative dispute resolution, unsuccessful party to pay adversary’s legal fees, and
auditor liability limited to client losses during the period.
Id.

75. See ON BEHALF OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, A STUDY ON SYSTEMS OF CIVIL
LIABILITY OF STATUTORY AUDITORS IN THE CONTEXT OF A SINGLE MARKET FOR AUDITING
SERVICES
IN
THE
EUROPEAN
UNION
6
(2001),
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/auditing/docs/liability/auditliability_en.pdf [hereinafter EU
STUDY]; Letter from April Mackenzie, Exec. Dir. Pub. Policy, Grant Thornton Int’l, to DG
Internal Mkt. & Servs, Unit 4F—Auditing Liab., European Comm’n, Consultation on Auditors’
Liability and its Impact on the European Capital Markets (March 15, 2007),
https://www.gti.org/files/ec%20auditor%20liability%20grant%20thornton%20international%20fi
nal.pdf.
76. EU STUDY, supra 75, at 21–22.
77. See CAROL A.N. ZACHARIAS, ACE PROGRESS REPORT: INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS
IN EXECUTIVE LIABILITY 17, 20 (2010), http://www.aceusa.com/Documents/Articles/ACE%
20Progress%20Report-%20Int'l%20Exec%20Liability.pdf.
78. See Commission Recommendation 473/2008, Concerning the Limitation of the Civil
Liability of Statutory Auditors and Audit Firms, 2008 O.J. (L 162) 39 (EC), available at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:162:0039:0040:EN:PDF.
79. Academics have also tried to address the liability problem. See, e.g., Lawrence A.
Cunningham, Securitizing Audit Failure Risk: An Alternative to Caps on Damages, 49 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 711 (2007).
80. See Accounting Firms Seek Liability Protection, ACCOUNTINGWEB (Dec. 15, 2005,
18:22), http://www.accountingweb.com/item/101579; Accountants Win Battle Over Liability,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 18, 2005, at 1.
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such waiver limitations inappropriate, even when authorized by another
country, such as the United Kingdom.81
In 2007, the “Advisory Committee on the Auditing Profession”82 to the
Department of the Treasury had “extensive discussion regarding the impact
of the . . . liability system on audit effectiveness and the . . . auditing
profession.”83 “[C]aps on damages paid by auditing firms . . . strengthening
[] bankruptcy defenses[, and] . . . government insurance for auditing firms,”
were among the potential changes discussed by the Advisory Committee.84
The accounting and auditing industries failed to make a persuasive case for
any legal reform,85 even though audit liability limits were sought to help
offset the “deep pocket” syndrome which increases their attractiveness as
targets of legal complaints.86 Auditors have rarely had success in seeking
statutory limits on their liability.87
The damages sought against the CPA firms are sometimes huge.88
About one-quarter of litigation cases now seek damages exceeding one
billion dollars.89 However, since 1995, the six largest CPA firms have paid
out less than six billion dollars to resolve 362 cases.90 Thus, on average, the
firms have paid less than 5% of the damages historically sought against
them.
A failed attempt to limit their legal liability was made by the accounting
and auditing profession in the United States through the Advisory
Committee.91 However, the Advisory Committee did agree to recommend
“a mechanism for the preservation and rehabilitation of troubled larger
public company auditing firms.”92 The audit firms had lost their best
political opportunity for legal liability limits during the early to mid 2000s
81. REPORT ON PCAOB, supra note 19, at 16.
82. U.S. TREASURY DEP’T, ADVISORY COMMITTEE

ON THE AUDITING PROFESSION: FINAL
REPORT (2008) [hereinafter ADVISORY COMMITTEE DRAFT REPORT].
83. Id. at VII: 23.
84. Id. at VII: 28.
85. The six largest auditing firms who audit 99% of the U.S. public companies had revealed
that they were defendants in ninety private actions related to audits of public and private
companies.
86. EU STUDY, supra note 75, at 69–70.
87. Id. at 74–79. One of the few successes the auditing industry has had in limiting their
liability was the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA). See Sanford P.
Dumain, Class Action Suits, Auditor Liability, and the Effect of Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995, SN073 A.L.I.-A.B.A. CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. 167 (2008). The PSLRA
established proportionate liability and made it more difficult to pursue class action lawsuits. See
Irving, Payne & Walker, supra note 74, at 2. However, academic “studies suggest that the reduced
[legal] exposure from the PSLRA may have led to less conservative auditing.” Id. at 8.
88. Seven of the ninety cases sought damages over $10 billion. ADVISORY COMMITTEE DRAFT
REPORT, supra note 82, at VII: 25.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Various countries have discussed limiting auditors’ liability. See, e.g., Clinton Free,
Limiting Auditors’ Liability, 11 BOND L. REV. 118 (1999).
92. ADVISORY COMMITTEE DRAFT REPORT, supra note 82, at VIII: 9.
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when Republicans controlled Congress under a Republican President. “[A]
Democratic Congress is unlikely to carve out special exemptions for the
accounting industry . . . .”93
The judicial system simply enforces the requirements for accountants
and auditors to exercise due professional care.94 Although auditing firms are
not insurance companies covering financial losses, if professional
negligence or fraud was conducted by the audit firm, responsible
individuals and the audit firm should not receive special legal protection.
IV. REFORMS NEEDED TO MINIMIZE LITIGATION AGAINST
AUDITORS
Failures in auditing and accounting continue to occur. In discussing the
aftermath of SOX, the SEC noted that it continues “to discover both
industry-wide and company specific failures of business ethics and of
disclosures to shareholders. Such failures are, of course, offensive and
unacceptable.”95
Legal reform is needed to encourage corporations to cooperate with
government investigations, particularly when the investigation concerns the
accuracy of financial information provided to the SEC. “Various
[worthwhile] prior proposals in Congress and the SEC deserve further
consideration.”96 Although some financial reform legislation occurred in
July 2010, the auditing profession may not welcome any increase in legal
exposure. However, the profession should bear a greater risk of legal
liability for audit failures when improper financial reporting is evident.
Society should not tolerate the grossly negligent failures in auditing which
93. See Carrie Johnson, Accounting for the Future: Down to Four Big Firms and Fearing the
Effects of Even One Major Suit, the Audit Industry Presses for Legal Relief, WASH. POST, Mar. 9,
2007, at D1.
94. According to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in 2002, it is an open question “[w]hether
a GAAP violation makes a financial disclosure misleading per se.” See Peltz v. Polyphase Corp.,
No. 01-15732, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 10849, at *5 (9th Cir. June 5, 2002). Courts have noted that
a showing of sub-standard accounting practices is circumstantial evidence that can support an
inference of bad faith for a § 10(b) claim under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Sub-standard
accounting practices should suggest that the representation in the financial statement was so
flimsy that there was no genuine belief in the accounting position taken.
95. Donald T. Nicolaisen, Chief Accountant, Office of the Chief Accountant, U.S. Sec. &
Exch. Comm’n, Remarks Before the 2004 AICPA National Conference on Current SEC and
PCAOB Developments (Dec. 6, 2004).
96. Pearson & Mark, supra note 18, at 115. The author has previously noted several potential
reforms:
In 2001, the House Judiciary Committee approved the “Financial Services Antifraud
Network Act” to create a network linking financial fraud databases. . . . In 2003,
Congress considered the “Securities Fraud Deterrence and Investor Restitution Act.”
This Act would have [several changes, such as] expand[ing] the maximum potential
penalties for securities fraud, allow[ing] the SEC access to grand jury information, and
increase[ing] the SEC’s subpoena powers.
Id.
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the PCAOB inspection reports revealed. This is a problem many courts
have ignored in § 10(b)(5) securities litigation. The global capital markets
need professional accounting and auditing work to maintain investor
confidence in the integrity of the capital markets.
Recent legislative changes from the Dodd-Frank financial reform
legislation strengthened the PCAOB by expanding its jurisdiction to
overseeing broker-dealers.97 However, further legislation is needed
regarding the oversight of financial audits. Congress should prepare
legislation that expands the PCAOB’s jurisdiction beyond the audit of
public companies, and strengthens investors’ confidence in relying on audit
opinions filed with the SEC.98
An adverse judgment in a class action lawsuit based on negligence
should cost a firm compensatory damages, but not excessive punitive
damages which would jeopardize the firm’s ability to continue to exist.
Government penalties present a better way to address systematically and
more consistently excessive negligence, than exorbitant punitive damages
in a court case. Although SOX has penalties to discourage wrongdoing,99
the potential rewards of wrongdoing in accounting or auditing may
sometimes still exceed the severity of legal penalties, if caught.
The accounting profession should expect that more legal liability
concerns in the courts may soon surface. Auditors will need to work with
forensic auditors and lawyers more often to help limit potential legal
exposure from letting the client maintain an improper accounting position,
without the auditors noting the problem in the audit report. “Sustainability
of the auditing profession ultimately [depends] upon the conduct of auditing
firms themselves, their business model, governance, leadership, and
especially their ‘tone at the top’—all of which are [extensively] linked to
audit quality[,]” as noted by some members of the Advisory Committee.100
More university education targeted at auditing, accounting, and relevant
business areas is needed for the future audit professional to respond to
likely future litigation.101 The need for an increased proportion of
97. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §
982, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
98. Currently, in most states third parties, such as investors, have no standing to rely on the
audit opinion of a public company’s financial statements.
99. 15 U.S.C. § 7215(c)(4)–(5) (2006).
100. ADVISORY COMMITTEE DRAFT REPORT, supra note 82, at VII: 29.
101. Often an auditor has just three hours of auditing and three hours of business law, despite
the need for increased knowledge. See generally Robert A. Prentice, The Case for Educating
Legally-Aware Accountants, 38 AM. BUS. L.J. 597 (2001). Future auditors also need more
accounting hours to learn how to research and analyze relevant professional standards and
authorities. Research skills are especially essential as the volume of accounting and auditing
professional standards and related legal requirements generally continues to increase. The
educational problem begins with undergraduate accounting education that typically has not taught
students how to research relevant professional authorities. More importantly, the education too
often has not reinforced the necessary research mentality to find and apply the accurate
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professional education at universities arises in part because of increased
business complexities and the various professional standards that
accountants and auditors of public companies must apply.102 A mandate by
State Boards of Accountancy may be needed to encourage more educational
institutions to respond to the professional needs of future accountants and
help minimize future litigation against auditors.103
The audit profession must adopt a commitment to quality by reducing
audit failures and using increased conservatism in issuing unqualified audit
opinions.104 A return to a technical skills—rather than client relation
skills—emphasis is needed for future audit partners. Technical knowledge
and research skills were often not emphasized at the local level of large
firms. In the process, the profession lost part of its commitment to
quality.105
CONCLUSIONS
This Article advances transparent understanding of litigation against
auditors for negligence. For the first time, fundamental duties under the
auditing and accounting standards are articulated. The auditing profession
cannot divorce itself from the law, as some would like to achieve. Instead,
further intertwining of the auditing profession with the law is likely. By
having failed both in the courts to abolish the PCAOB and in Congress to
acquire more liability protection, extensive litigation against auditors for
negligence appears likely to remain in the future.
More second guessing of audits of clients’ financial statements in the
legal environment is likely with the adoption by the FASB of more
principled accounting standards. Given how the PCAOB inspection reports
have revealed an unacceptable lack of quality in the audit profession’s
work, it is likely that future reforms of the audit profession will further
address improper audits of financial statements. If the audit profession is
serious about stopping or even reversing this trend, the profession must take
professional answer. Cf. THOMAS R. WEIRICH, THOMAS C. PEARSON, & NATALIE T. CHURYK,
ACCOUNTING AND AUDITING RESEARCH: TOOLS AND STRATEGIES (7th ed. 2010) (attempting to
correct the problem by developing the readers’ research skills).
102. A master’s degree is needed for future audit professionals in order for students to pursue
real world accounting and auditing research, case courses, and additional knowledge in auditing
and accounting. The proposed change would only slightly modify the existing rule for a total 150
hours of university education. Future accountants also need more business knowledge and practice
developing skills in information technology and finance to master complex accounting topics, for
example those stemming from sophisticated financial products, such as derivatives.
103. See Pearson, supra note 5, at 116, 118.
104. The profession could also encourage members to seek a Malcolm Baldrige national quality
award. See Baldrige Performance Excellence Program, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH.,
http://www.nist.gov/baldrige/enter/index.cfm (last visited Jan. 24, 2011).
105. The prior theory was that local partners skilled in client relations would always contact the
national office experts for help when questions existed at the local level, despite some differences
in economic motivations.
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greater responsibility to meet the public’s expectations of quality audits of
financial statements.
Taking responsibility by the audit profession must include preparing
higher quality future audit professionals. However, proposed changes face
various obstacles that preserve the status quo. But if the profession does not
take increased responsibility, more litigation against auditors is likely.

